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THE PRIXCIPLES OF JAIXA ETHICS
BY ALBAX G. WIDGERY
JAIX^TSM is a form of belief and practice of a small but influential
community in India. It is probable that in earlier times the num-
ber of its adherents was far greater than at present : it is certain
that they formerly possessed considerable political power and wide-
spread organizations in Bengal, in the south around Mysore, and in
Kathiawar. Most occidental scholars and some Indian writers still
persist in describing Jainism as an ofif-shoot or reform of Brahman-
ical Hinduism. There seems to be more justification for the view
of its own scholarly adherents that it was originally an independent
movement not arising out of the Brahmanical tradition. It points
back to a series of twenty-four Tirthankara or teachers of the present
age, two of whom at least are generally regarded even by occidental
students to be historical : Parsvanatha and Mahavira. The form
which Jainism has at present is accredited to the reform and revival
inaugurated by Mahavira. However its doctrines may have origin-
ated and developed in the past, it is now essentially a dogmatic sys-
tem : certain fundamental conceptions and terms are accepted from
tradition and from writings regarded as authoritative, and reflection
amongst Jainas is directed to expounding the meanings of these
terms and defending the validity of these conceptions.
Though Jainism may with good reason be called a religion, its
main motive is ethical. By this is not to be understood ethical in
the sense of predominantly sociological or otherwise humanistically
utilitarian. Jainism, as ethical, is bound up with a definite system of
metaphysics and with much of the character of rudimentary psy-
chology. As a system of ethics it teaches a way of redemption from
evil and of attainment of the good. This involves the ratna fraya
or three jewels, right faith, right knowledge, right conduct. But
though the ethical is central and fundamental it is developed in
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Taina writings so frequently from the metaphysical background
that any adequate exposition must give definite attention to this.
It comes best into view in the consideration of the second of the
three jewels, right knowledge.
Right faith is variously interpreted. In the minds of many Jainas
it appears to be regarded as the general acceptance of or belief in
Jainism, just as among many Christians faith is thought to be ac-
ceptance of and belief in Christianity. It is a sort of rationalization
from this position as implying belief that leads Mr. J. L. Jaini to
describe it by the not very consistent expressions of "reasoned knowl-
edge." "belief in things ascertained as they are" ; "it is a sort of
sight of a thing" (TS. p. 15).i The essential implication appears
to be an attitude of mind. Right faith, says Mr. C. R. Jain, "only
opens the outlook of life to embrace the highest good." It has "its
eve constantly fixed on the great ideal of perfection and bliss" (KK.
887, 886). 2
'
Though kcvali jnana or omniscience is included as an aspect of
perfection, there is little in Jaina writings to suggest that knowledge
is or should be pursued for interest in it as such, for any intrinsic
worth, as knowledge for its own sake. The purpose of its pursuit
is its bearing on the attainment of the ethical end of redemption and
self-realization. "Right knowledge is the detailed knowledge of the
process of self-realization, without which nothing but confusion can
be expected as a result of action." It is intended "to furnish an ac-
curate description of the path to be traversed, of the obstacles to be
encountered on the way, and of the means to be adopted to steer
clear of them." ( KK. 887) Jaina metaphysics and psychology are
developed with this aim in view. Moral conduct is said to depend
on correct knowledge. "First of all a person must have knowledge
of substances existing in this universe, and then proceed to regulate
his conduct accordingly." ( DS. translator's preface xii)^
Right knowledge is of five kinds according to Jaina classification.
iTattvarfhadhigaina Sutra: A treatise on the essential principles of Jain-
ism. By Sri Umasvami Acharya ; translated by J. L. Jaini. Arrah, India.
1920. Hereafter referred to as TS.
^The Key of Knozvledge. By Champat Rai Jain. Arrah, India. 1919. 2nd
ed. Hereafter referred to as KK.
^Dravya-Samgraha: A Compendium of Substances. By Nemichandra
Siddhanta-Chakravarti. with a commentary by Brahma-Deva. Translated by
S. C. Ghoshal. Arrah, India. 1918. Hereafter referred to as DS.
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Jaina writers have a fondness for making classifications and lists.
This practice no doubt arose in part through their convenience for
oral instruction of adepts and for facilitating memorization. The
divisions are often not strictly in conformity vv^ith the principles of
occidental logic in that they frequently overlap and do not always
imply the application of one fiindaineiititin divisionis in each group
of classes. The precise significance of some of the following di-
visions of knowledge is not clear. The five kinds of knowledge are:
1 ) knowledge of the self and the non-self by means of the mind and
the senses; 2) knowledge from the scriptures: 3) direct knowledge
of matter: 4) direct knowledge of another's mental activity about
matter ; 5 ) omniscience, being knowledge of all things in all their as-
pects at all times (TS.21). "In the state of perfect knowledge we
have a clear idea of the real nature of everything, ego and non-ego,"
that is, both darsana (general) and jnana (detailed) knowledge.
(DS.105).
The fundamental concepts of Jainism have been grouped in lists
with comparatively slight variations. The most definite is that of
the seven tattvas or principles: 1) jk'a the living: 2) a-jiva, the non-
living; 3) asrava, the influx of ajiva to jh'a\ 4) bandlia, the bondage
of jiva to the ajizn associated with it: 5) sarnvara, the cessation of
the influx of ajiva to jwa 6) nirjara, the elimination of ajiva from
jii'a; 7) nioksJia, the state of complete liberation and bliss. Another
list, under the name of the padartlias, gives the above seven with the
addition of: 8) papa, vice or demerit: and 9) piinya, virtue or
merit.
The two most fundamental concepts are jiva and ajiva, the living
and the non-living. Jiva is an agent, possessing the attribute or con-
sisting of chciana, consciousness, intelligence. It is amarta, that is, it
cannot be apprehended by the senses and has no qualities which can
be apprehended by the senses. It is not found as one universal con-
sciousness, but as a multiplicity of indixiduals. There is an infinite
number of jiva. They may be grouped in two classes: uiukta jiva:
those entirely free or liberated ; and sainsari jiva, those entangled in
the meshes of samsara or transmigration associated with bodies.
All jiva are in essence eternal, unoriginated simple substances with
no beginning and no end to their existence. There are jiva every-
where in the world we know, in plants, animals, mankind, and for
the cosmology of popular fancy in hell and the realm of the gods.
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Saiiisori jiva are of varying grades in the level of existence viewed
from the standpoint of perfection. As such their existence consists
in a series of finite life courses until the state of perfection is reached
and the condition of finitude ceases. The forms jiva thus assume
are due to their own activity, yet "in spite of the origin and decay of
forms the soul (jiva) maintains its nature and identity" (PS. 17).^
In fact, in essence, the jiva is eternally perfect : imi)erfection can
he rightly attrihuted only to the embodied jiva as a totality of jiva-
ajiva. Though the intelligence of jiz'a may be obscured it can never
be destroyed. Now while it is believed that certain individual jiva
have from this embodied state attained the perfect state of pure
jiz'o, it is maintained that at present, and as far back as we may go
in the lives of the other jiz'a, they are and have been in the condi-
tion of finite embodiment. Those who have attained perfection are
jina or conquerors. Thus "every jiva to begin with is a kaniw-jiva,
and nirvana is a unique state to be acquired anew and for the first
time. The state of nature is not a state of freedom. It is a state of
bondage. Jiva finds itself in chains and by its own exertion secures
its own freedom." (PS. 19) All that the jina or conquerors can
do for others is to teach them the truths, the right knowledge, and
inspire them with the right faith : actual attainment depends en-
tirely on individual effort. Regarded as realistic the Jaina view of
jiz'a was opj^osed to the nihilistic and anatta theory developed in
early lUiddhism. ''That he is infinite in perfection and yet finite with
reference to temporal life, that he is born into perfection and yet
dead from sauisara: that he is the negation of all extrinsic qualities,
and still the affirmation of his own intrinsic nature ; that he has
knowledge perfect, and yet devoid of knowledge, imperfect : these
eight attributes will not be associated with him if nirvana is inter-
preted nihilistically" (PS. 33).
In the scale of samsari jiva, the humanly embodied jiva are dis-
tinguished from those below them by the possession of reason. There
are thus three aspects of the life of this samsari jiva: I) the cog-
nitive, darsana and jnaua: 2) the active kariiia-cJiefana : 3) the af-
fective, hedonic and non-hedonic, kama-phaJa-chctana. Feelings are
siibha bliava, pleasant : asubha bJiava, unpleasant ; and sndha bhava,
pure. The first two depend on external contact ; the last one is the
iPaiichastikayasam. The five cosmic constituents. By Sri Kundakini-
dacharya. Translated by A. Chakravartinayanar. Arrah, India. 1920. Here-
after referred to as PS.
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enjoyment of the self by the self not depending on external contact.
The emotions are of two main types: 1) sakashaya. as anger, pride,
which defile the soul: and 2) akashaya, as sorrow, which do not de-
file the soul but aid in its purification. The cognitive and feeling as-
pects of experience being due predominantl}' to activity, activity is
the most important of these three aspects of the soul. If on the one
hand activity may lead to l)ondage, on the other it is activity which
liberates the soul if the proper rules are observed.
Xot following the usual order of the tattvas as given above, at-
tention may next be directed to the Jaina ideal, moksha. This is seen
in the essential nature of jn'a itself. As conscious the jiva has the
capacity of knowing, but there is nothing to show that what any
one jk'a may know, an}- other jiva might not also know. Each jiz'a
is thus regarded as potentially capable of omniscience. Actual om-
niscience is part of perfection. It is maintained along similar lines
that the jiva is capable of perfect and complete bliss, and also of
perfect freedom from restraint or constraint from beyond itself.
The ideal is a condition of omniscience, complete freedom, and per-
fect bliss, and to these attributes is sometimes added omnipotence
thotigh it would seem that the significance of this in such a scheme
must be the same as complete freedom.
Freedom and bliss are very closely related, as will be seen by a
consideration of the nature of bliss. Bliss is not pleasure. Pleasure
and pain are experienced through the relation of jiz'a to something
other than itself. Pain may come through its association with a
physical organism or body. Pleasure may be obtained by means of
the physical organs, as hearing a musical symphony or tasting nice
foods. Pleasure and pain being themselves simply accompaniments
of particular transient experiences are temporary and impermanent.
Pleasure depending on external conditions cannot be the ultimate
good of a free spiritual being, the good of which to be entirely with-
in its own power must be within itself.
The ideal state of jiva being one of infinity, perfect freedom, and
bliss, contrasted with the experience of finitude and bondage in which
it is immersed in the ordinary conditions of this life, the cause of
these experiences calls for close consideration. Expressed briefly the
cause is the conjunction of jiva with ajiva. It has been observed
that the Jainas rarely recognise and never attempt to solve the prob-
lem as to how jiva could exer have become originally entangled with
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ajiva. At the commencement of each life in the reahn of sanisara
the jiva is associated with some ajiva. But, further, it may iDy its ac-
tivity draw more to itself. This is the process indicated by the 'term
asrava. It is here that the term karma comes into use in Jainism.
The activity of jiva draws to it, or holds to itself, karmic matter.
Two problems are thus implied: 1) How is the influx of karmic
matter to be arrested? and 2) How is the karmic matter already as-
sociated with jk'a to be got rid of ?
In Jainism the term karma has implications other than it has in
Brahmanical Hinduism and in Buddhism. For it is implicated with
the idea of ajiva as matter. Nevertheless, there is much to suggest
that the karmarm or karmic body of mundane souls is not exacth'
the same as the physical bodies of men and animals, though it makes
these possible. It is "subtler," "finer," it "hears no sounds, sees
no sights, etc" and cannot be a source of enjoyment (TS. 75). Yet
Mr. Jaini expresses the common Jaina view when he says : "all
karmas are material." For Jainism, therefore, the body is the prison
house of the soul. Through its transmigrations it occupies a series
of such prisons. The soul is in bondage, bandha. As the goal is to
be reached by escape from this bondage, the way is essentially as-
cetic. Not all are able to embark directly on the path of asceticism
in its more austere forms. Hence Jainism, like the Christian ethics
of the Middle Ages, has a lower and a higher discipline, the path of
the householder and the path of the monk or nun.
The third jewel, right conduct, which is thought to be made pos-
sible by the attainment of the knowledge of the character of exis-
tence which we have considered in outline, is "doing the right thing
at the right moment": it is the "force which actually propels the
barge of being havenwards" (KK. 887). There can be talk of right
conduct only with respect to jiva as associated with a-jiva. For "per-
fect conduct consists in checking all kinds of activities which are
opposed to the characteristics of the soul, which is (in itself) de-
void of all actions, eternal, consisting of pure jnana and darsana''
(DS. 109). With reference to the rules and precepts of right con-
duct there are many different yet generally overlapping lists. The
ethical rules of the householder-'* are called annvrata, the (five)
minor vows ; those of the monk and nun, the mahavrata, the major
•'•See the Ratna-Kayanda-Sravakachara: The householder's dharma. By
Sri Samanta Bhadr Acharya. Translated by C. R. Jain. Arrah, India. 1917.
Hereafter referred to as RKS.
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vows. The aniivrata are: 1) ahluisa, non-killing etc. (discussed in
detail later) ; 2) anrita, not to commit falsehood; 3) steya, not to
steal: 4) ahrahma, not to be imchaste : 5) parigraJia, not to be at-
tached to worldly things. These faults are described as "the veri-
table wombs of pain." Another list of the five kinds of right conduct
gives them as: 1) equanimity: 2) recovery of equanimity after fall-
ing from it: 3) pure and absolute non-injury: 4) all but entire free-
dom from passion: 5) ideal and passionless conduct. By way of
elaboration of these are the forms of external and internal fapas or
austerities: \) fasting, the renunciation of luxuries, etc.: 2) expi-
ation, (including self-analysis, repentance, and confession) : 3) rever-
ence for the three jewels of Jainism, and respect: 4) service, es-
pecially to the saints and fellow members of the order: 5) study;
6) giving up attachments to worldly objects, and bodily passions ;
7) concentration on the righteous and pure and avoidance of the
painful and wicked. Still another hst recognised in Jaina books,
though the classes overlap, is of interest fo"r its ethical import : the
list of ten dJiannas: I) self-control: 2) truthfulness: 3) purity: 4)
chastity: 5) absence of greed: 6) asceticism: 7) forbearance and
patience; 8) mildness: 9) sincerity: 10) freedom from all sins.
The ultimate motive in Jaina ethics must be said to be definitely
egoistic. The bliss which a jiva attains can only be through his own
effort, no action of another can in any way affect it. Logically, there-
fore, one might say that as it is impossible to bring bliss to another
it is futile to entertain the notion of altruistic conduct. But on such
matters other Indian systems besides Jainism are notoriously inco-
herent. As one would expect, in practice Jainism does insist on what
may be called social virtues. Indeed, its chief ethical maxim is in-
terpreted so as to imply them. The motto often used "for Jainism
is : ahimsa parama dhanua, non-killing the highest duty. So trans-
lated aJii)iisa. the leading concept of Jaina practical ethics, has the
negative implication of abstention ; but the description given in Jaina
literature and insisted on by Jainas is also positive, the cultivation of
an attitude of universal kindness and conduct in conformity there-
with.
There is much psychological insight of a rudimentary kind in the
Jaina system, in the attempts to formulate the conditions and pro-
cesses aiding in the attainment of the moral ideal. The root of the
whole process of self-redemption or self-realization is self-control.
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Without this inner attitude, the external practice of taf>as or austeri-
ties is of no avail. Self-control implies freedom from desire and
aversion, and the passions in which desire and aversion are expressed.
There are four fundamental passions which can be overcome by the
control of the senses: these are called kasayas: 1) anger; 2) vanity
and pride 3) insincerity and deceit: 4) greed. It is recognised that
passions may be considered from the points of view of protensity,
intensity, and extensity, and are to be dealt with accordingly. Moral
advance is first by control of the grosser passions, then to the control
of all desire and aversion and to the control of thoughts. As an aid
to this vows are recommended in accordance with which one sets
a limit to the extent of one's possessions or to the area within which
one will travel, either to be adhered to for a certain length of time
or for always. There is insistence on the practice, daily if possible,
of prafikraviana, self-examination with admission of one's faults
and repentance for them ; and pratyakhyana, the resolution to avoid
definite sins in future. Self-control is assisted mainly by particular
forms of meditation. "Dhyana or meditation is of supreme impor-
tance for a person who seeks liberation" (DS. 110). There should
be meditation on the transitoriness of all things, that youth, the
sources of pleasure, are all temporary, that death comes to all. Medi-
tation on the crude and impure nature of one's physical body is
to lead to a cessation of the desire and the effort to find pleasure in
it. On the other hand, one should meditate on one's spiritual nature.
By the contemplation of universal kindness one may become freed
from egoistic passions.
Considering the principle that the jiva is in itself perfect eter-
nally, and that morality consists in its liberation from associations
which limit it, it is not surprising that the moral life appears to be
more concerned with the eradication of vices than with the cultiva-
tion of what are usually considered positive virtues. Whatever
modern Jainas may say to the contrary, that is the impression given
by their authoritative books. An enumeration of some of their
precepts will show this at the same time as illustrating the practical
aspects of Jaina ethics. The Jaina layman is to abstain from intoxi-
cants, from fiesh food, from fruits likely to contain insects. He
should not eat at night, when there is not enough light to observe
insects which may have got into the food. He should not earn his
living by agriculture, for thereb}- he may kill or injure many small
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organisms. Xor should he follow the profession of a soldier, which
involves killing. He should not earn his living by music, presumably
because music has so often in India been used in connection with
dancing stimulating the jiassions. He should limit his daily work,
his food, and his enjoyment—so that these shall not come to domin-
ate or occupy much of his attention. He should observe regular
fasts, and each day show some charity by gifts of knowledge, medi-
cine, food, or comfort. He must not use the property of another
without his consent, and not express admiration at another's pomp
or prosperity. Sexual passion and its practical expression, lewd and
voluptuous speech, another man's wife, and prostitutes, are to be
avoided. Excessive passion between the married, matrimonial match-
making, and all forms of unnatural gratification are condemned.
Making false docrments. spreading false doctrines, uttering false-
hoods or causing others to utter them are evil. It is also wrong to
tell truth which causes atHiction to others if it is possible to avoid
telling it. Back-biting, revealing secrets, such as telling of the hid-
den deformities of another are condemned. Stealing, giving instruc-
tion in methods of thieving, receiving stolen goods, keeping false
weights and measures, practising adulteration, and not returning in
full a deposit made by another, are all mentioned as sins (see e.g.
RKS. ii, iii, iv. v.). The ascetic has naturally to observe all these,
but for his higher path, the rules have to be applied more stringent-
ly. While for the householder the vow of chastity is to avoid adul-
tery, for the monk and nun it implies complete celibacy, the avoid-
ance of all sex acts, and abstention of all talk or thoughts on sex.
"If there be a cessation of sin. other things, wealth, prosperity, etc.,
are not needed ; but if the influx of sin still continues, then what
purpose can be served by wealth and the like?", that is. sinlessness
is the occasion of bliss (RKS. 16).
There is little stress on positive social virtues in Jaina sys-
tematic writings, but more of that kind can be found in folklore
stories used for purposes of po]:»ular moral teaching. It has been
noted previously that the central concej^tion of ahiinsa, non-killing,
has been given a positive interpretation of universal kindness. The
Jaina recension of the tales collected together in the Panchatanira
has a number of ethical maxims of which the following may be
taken as examples : "What virtue is there in the goodness of the
man who is good to his benefactors? He (only) who is good to
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those who do him wrong is called good by the virtuous" (i. 277).
"Hear the sum of righteousness, and when thou hast heard, ponder
it ; Do not to others what would be repugnant to thyself." (iii. 103)
Dana, gift or charity is frequently praised, especially charity shown
to members of the ascetic orders, but it should also be shown to
Jaina or non-Jaina (TS. 154). There is to be "tender affection for
one's brothers on the path to liberation" (TS. 134) : and humility
together with proclaiming the good qualities of others (TS. 135) ;
and pity and compassion for the afflicted.
The purpose of this exposition is to give a brief description of
the main characteristics of Jaina ethics, and not to examine it criti-
cally. Most of its defects are obvious. But notwithstanding these
it represents an attempt to make spirituality and inner spiritual
freedom the essence of morality and constitutes a noteworthy con-
trast to the ethics of humanism and worldly civilization of no small
part of the occidental world.
